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ustained, well-targeted, and effectively used investments in R&D have reaped handsome rewards from
improved agricultural productivity and cheaper, higher quality foods and fibers. As we begin a new millennium,
the global patterns of investments in agricultural R&D are changing in ways that may have profound
consequences for the structure of agriculture worldwide and the ability of poor people in poor counties to feed
themselves.
This report documents and discusses these changing investment patterns, highlighting developments in the public
and private sectors. It revises and carries forward to 2000 data that were previously reported in the 2001 IFPRI
Food Policy Report Slow Magic:Agricultural R&D a Century After Mendel. Some past trends are continuing or have
come into sharper focus, while others are moving in new directions not apparent in the previous series. In addition,
this report illustrates the use of spatial data to analyze spillover prospects among countries or agroecologies and the
targeting of R&D to address specific production problems like drought-induced production risks. More detailed data























hroughout the 20th century,improvements in agricultural productivity have considerably alleviated
poverty and starvation and fueled economic progress.Further,a large body of evidence closely links
productivity improvements to investments in agricultural research and development (R&D).1 In the past
several decades,however,many countries have made major changes in the way they fund and organize public
agricultural R&D and the incentives affecting private R&D.These changes are reflected in the shifting patterns
of support for agricultural R&D,reported here,raising questions about the prospects for sustaining produc-
tivity growth over the next several decades and beyond.
Total Science Spending
Agricultural R&D is not conducted in isolation from
the rest of science.2Agricultural scientists have a long
history of drawing on and adapting findings from the
basic biological,chemical,and other sciences to further
their own research,and scientific spillovers have flowed
in the other direction as well.Moreover,given contem-
porary developments,particularly in the genetic and
informational sciences,the boundaries between agricul-
ture and other sciences are increasingly becoming
blurred.Consequently,putting the agricultural sciences in
the context of overall science spending is instructive.
In 2000,$731 billion was invested in all the sciences
worldwide,3 including research conducted by both public
agencies and private firms.This represented about 1.7
percent of the world’s $42.4 trillion gross domestic
product (GDP) that year,and an increase of nearly one-
third over the inflation-adjusted total of just five years
earlier (Table 1).Real spending in all regions of the world
Table 1—Total gross domestic expenditures on research and development, 1995 and 2000
SOURCES: Based on Pardey,Dehmer,and El Feki (2006) using data from numerous sources.
NOTES:The number of countries included in the regional totals is shown in parentheses.“Other developing countries” includes many Eastern
European,former Soviet countries;“Latin America and the Caribbean” includes Mexico,a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD);“high-income countries”only includes the high-income members of the OECD—thus excluding a number
of high-income countries,such as South Korea and French Polynesia (grouped under Asia–Pacific),Bahrain,Israel,Kuwait,Qatar,and United Arab
Emirates (grouped under Middle East and North Africa),and the Bahamas (grouped under Latin America and the Caribbean).All data were first
compiled in current local currency units,then deflated to 2000 constant currency units,and finally converted to international dollars using
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.
Region/country 1995 2000 1995 2000
Developing countries 
Asia–Pacific (26) 52,416 94,950 9.3 13.0
China 19,469 48,247 3.5 6.6
India 11,678 20,749 2.1 2.8
Latin America and the Caribbean (32) 17,222 21,244 3.1 2.9
Brazil 9,771 12,398 1.7 1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 3,008 3,992 0.5 0.5
Middle East and North Africa (18) 8,626 14,893 1.5 2.0
Other developing countries (21) 19,002 21,895 3.4 3.0
Developing-country subtotal (141) 100,274 156,975 17.9 21.5
High-income countries
Japan 89,964 99,500 16.0 13.6
United States 196,358 263,043 35.0 36.0
High-income country subtotal (23) 461,367 573,964 82.1 78.5
Total (164) 561,641 730,939 100.0 100.0
Total R&D expenditures 
(million 2000 international dollars)























increased between 1995 and 2000,but growth was
uneven.4 Of the developing countries,the most notable
increases were in the Asia–Pacific and Middle East and
North Africa regions,with hefty increases of 11.9 and
11.5 percent,respectively (the latter fueled by rapid
spending increases in Israel and Turkey).While the
overall average rate of growth for developing countries
was 8.6 percent per year over the 1995–2000
timeframe,regional averages for developing countries
ranged from lows of 1.9 percent per year for the “other
developing countries” category (which includes several
former Soviet states) and 3.0 percent per year for Sub-
Saharan Africa,to notable highs of 19.7 percent per year
for China and 12.2 percent per year for India.
These regional trends hide a profoundly disturbing
reality—evidence of a large and,in places,growing divide
between the scientific haves and have-nots.For example,
the overall growth in the Asia–Pacific region masks the
fact that just two countries,China and India,accounted
for 89 percent of the $42.5 billion increase in regional
spending from 1995 to 2000.Put another way,China and
India accounted for 59 percent of the region’s scientific
spending in 1995,jumping to 73 percent of the regional
total by 2000.In contrast,while research spending in the
seven Pacific countries (including Fiji,French Polynesia,
New Caledonia,and others) grew by as much as 9.4
percent annually from 1995,this was from an exception-
ally small base,so their $120.7 million total in 2000
represents just a minuscule 0.13 percent of the
Asia–Pacific region’s total science spending.
Although geographically large and home to over 10
percent of the world’s population,Sub-Saharan Africa
accounts for just 0.5 percent of the world’s gross invest-
ment in science.Further,South Africa,with less than 7
percent of this region’s population,accounts for about
two-thirds of the regional total for gross domestic
expenditures on R&D.While 39 of the 44 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa for which data are available increased
their investments in R&D between 1995 and 2000,South
Africa accounted for about 61 percent of the nearly $1
billion increase.
Middle East and North Africa fared a bit better than
Sub-Saharan Africa,with a real increase of R&D invest-
ment of almost 73 percent between 1995 and 2000.
Indeed,the only country tracked in this region that
reported a decrease in investment was Kuwait,with a
period decline of almost 34 percent.As in Sub-Saharan
Africa,however,the growth is highly concentrated,with
Israel and Turkey alone accounting for almost 79 percent
of the region’s increase during this period.
The bifurcation in science spending is widespread,
and these new data make the significant geopolitical
concentration of science spending worldwide manifestly
clear.In 2000,the top five countries (in descending
order,the United States,Japan,Germany,France,and the
United Kingdom) accounted for 68.6 percent of the
world’s total science spending,and the two top spending
countries alone (the United States and Japan) accounted
for 63 percent of the total for Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
countries.5 Expanding this group to the top 10
countries—which includes Italy,Canada,the lower
income but fast-growing countries China and India,and
South Korea—the share comes in at 81.6 percent of the
world total.Moreover,the share of the bottom 80
countries (accounting for 11.1 percent of the world’s
population in 2000 but only 2.4 percent of global GDP)
slipped from 0.29 percent of the global total in 1995 to
0.26 percent in 2000.Put together,this is evidence of a
large and sustained,if not growing,gap between a
comparatively small group of scientific haves and a






















Cross-country comparisons of R&D expendi-
tures,like most international comparisons of
economic activity more generally,are
confounded by substantial differences in price
levels among countries.This is particularly a
problem when valuing something like expendi-
tures on agricultural R&D,where typically two-
thirds of the expenditures are on local scientists
and support staff,not capital or other goods
and services that are commonly traded interna-
tionally.For example,the average salary
received by full professors working at large
public universities in the United States (net of
benefits) was $88,457 in 2004/05. A comparable
annual salary paid to a chief scientific officer in
Bangladesh working for the national govern-
ment’s main agricultural research agency was TK
20,700 (equivalent to 1,683 international dollars
when converted using purchasing power parities
[PPPs] or only US$316 when converted using
official exchange rates),while a mid-career
senior scientist working for Embrapa,Brazil,
earned an average of 72,348 reals (65,705 inter-
national dollars or US$30,020).
Converting research expenditures from
different countries to a single currency using
official exchange rates tends to understate the
quantity of research resources used in
economies with relatively low prices,while over-
stating the quantity of resources used in
countries with high prices.aAt present,there is
no entirely satisfactory method for comparing
consumption or expenditures among countries
at different points in time (or for that matter,at
the same point in time).Unfortunately,the choice of deflator and currency converter can have substantial consequences
for both the measure obtained and its interpretation.
Most of the research expenditures in this report are denominated in 2000 “international dollars”using PPPs to do the
currency conversions.b For convenience of interpretation,the reference currency—here an international dollar—is set equal
to a U.S.dollar in the benchmark year.
Figure B1 contrasts the regional expenditure shares both for public agricultural research expenditures using PPPs versus
official exchange rates to do the currency conversion.The left-hand side of the figure denotes 2000 research spending in
international dollars obtained using PPPs,while the right-hand side of the figure reports the U.S.dollar estimates obtained
using the same underlying R&D data together with official exchange rates.Taking the PPP estimates to be more representa-
tive of the amount of resources committed to research,the U.S.dollar estimates overstate the share of developed-country
agricultural research in the global total and grossly understate the African,Chinese,and other Asia–Pacific shares.
SOURCES: Pardey,Roseboom,Craig 1992;World Bank 2005b.
aA country’s international price level is the ratio of its PPP rate to its official currency exchange rate for U.S.dollars.In other words,the international price
level is an index of the costs of goods in one country at the current rate of exchange relative to the costs of the same bundle of goods in a numeraire
country, in this case the United States.For example,in 2000 the ratio of PPP to exchange rate for Australia was 0.77,indicating that average prices in
Australia were 23 percent lower than they were in the United States.The corresponding ratio for Bangladesh was 0.22,meaning that a bundle of goods and
services purchased for $100 in the United States cost only $22 dollars in Bangladesh.
bWe use a procedure described by Pardey,Roseboom,and Craig (1992) that first deflates research expenditures expressed in current local currency units to
a base year set of prices (2000,in this case) using a local price deflator and then converts to a common currency unit (specifically,international dollars)
using PPPs for 2000 obtained from the World Bank (2005b) rather than the more familiar official exchange rates.
INTERNATIONALLY COMPARABLE MEASURES OF R&D
Figure B1  Agricultural research spending in U.S. versus international 
     dollars, 2000
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orldwide,public investments in agricultural research increased by 51 percent in inflation-adjusted
terms over the past two decades,from an estimated $15.2 billion (2000 international dollars) in 1981
to $23.0 billion in 2000 (Table 2).These data reveal a significant structural shift:during the 1990s,developing
countries as a group undertook more of the world’s public agricultural research than the developed
countries.6 The Asia–Pacific region has continued to gain ground,accounting for an ever-larger share of the
developing-country total since 1981.Just two countries from this region,China and India,accounted for 39.1
percent of the developing world’s expenditure on agricultural R&D in 2000,a substantial increase from their
22.9 percent combined share in 1981.In stark contrast,Sub-Saharan Africa has continued to lose market
share,falling from 17.3 to 11.4 percent of the developing-world total between 1981 and 2000.
Public Agricultural R&D 
Research Spending Trends
Paralleling spending patterns for all the sciences,
agricultural R&D has become increasingly concentrated
in a handful of countries worldwide.Just four
countries—the United States,Japan,France,and
Germany—accounted for two-thirds of the public
research done by rich countries in 2000,about the same
as two decades before.Similarly,just five developing
countries—China,India,Brazil,Thailand,and South
Africa—undertook 53.3 percent of the developing
world’s public agricultural research in 2000,up from 40
Table 2—Total public agricultural research expenditures by region, 1981, 1991, and 2000
SOURCES:Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data;Pardey and Beintema (2001);
RICYT (2005);Casas,Solh,and Hafez (1999);OECD (2005);Eurostat (2005);and USDA/CRIS (2006).
NOTES:The number of countries included in the regional totals is shown in parentheses.See notes to Table 1 regarding country aggregation/
groupings.These estimates exclude Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries.Regional totals were scaled up from national spending
estimates for countries that represented 79 percent of the reported Sub-Saharan African total,89 percent of the Asia–Pacific total,86 percent of
the Latin America and Caribbean total,57 percent of the Middle East and North Africa total,and 84 percent of the high-income country total.
Region/country 1981 1991 2000 1981 1991 2000
Developing countries 
Asia–Pacific (28) 3,047 4,847 7,523 20.0  24.2  32.7 
China 1,049 1,733 3,150 6.9 8.7  13.7 
India 533 1,004 1,858 3.5 5.0  8.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean (27) 1,897 2,107 2,454 12.5  10.5  10.7 
Brazil 690 1,000 1,020 4.5 5.0  4.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa (44) 1,196 1,365 1,461 7.9 6.8  6.3 
Middle East and North Africa (18) 764 1,139 1,382 5.0  5.7  6.0 
Developing-country subtotal (117) 6,904 9,459 12,819 45.4  47.3  55.7 
High-income countries
Japan 1,832 2,182 1,658 12.1 10.9 7.2 
United States 2,533 3,216 3,828 16.7  16.1  16.6 
High-income country subtotal (22) 8,293 10,534 10,191 54.6  52.7  44.3 
Total (139) 15,197 19,992 23,010 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Agricultural R&D spending 
(million 2000 international dollars)
Share of global total
(percent)Table 3—Spatial concentration of public expenditures in agricultural R&D worldwide, 1995 and 2000
SOURCES: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data and World Bank (2006).
NOTES:The top 10 agricultural R&D expenditure countries in 1995 (in descending order) were United States,Japan,China,India,Brazil,Germany,
South Korea,Australia,United Kingdom,and France;the top 10 countries in 2000 (in descending order) were United States,China,India,Japan,
Brazil,Germany,Australia,South Korea,United Kingdom,and Canada.GDP and population data are from 2000;agricultural production and land
area data are from 2002.
Top 5 47.5 50.0 52.6 51.8 22.7 38.6 42.8 40.4
Top 10 61.7 62.4 66.5 56.1 33.2 52.8 54.2 53.4
Bottom 80 8.6 6.3 5.7 11.3 13.6 7.1 3.9 5.8
2000–02 (percent)
Country 1995 2000 Agricultural
grouping (percent) (percent) GDP Population land
Agricultural production
Crops Livestock  Total
percent in 1981.7 Meanwhile,only 6.3 percent of agricul-
tural R&D worldwide was conducted in 80 (mainly low-
income) countries—home to some 625 million people in
2000 and accounting for nearly 14 percent of the world’s
agricultural land area.Notably,this 80-country share of
global agricultural R&D spending is slightly more than
their corresponding value share (5.8 percent) of
worldwide agricultural output (Table 3).
A shifting and widely disbursed pattern of growth is
evident among regions (Figure 1).Certainly,the more
recent rates of increase in inflation-adjusted spending for
all developing regions of the world failed to match the
rapid ramping up of public agricultural R&D spending of
the 1970s (Pardey and Beintema 2001).The growth in
spending for the Asia–Pacific region held
strong,averaging 4.3 percent per year in the
1980s and 3.9 percent per year in the
decade to follow.Growth in China and India
picked up in the late 1990s,in both
instances reflecting government policies to
revitalize public research and improve its
commercialization prospects—including
linkages with the private sector.8 Spending
growth throughout the Latin American
region as whole was more robust during
the 1990s than the 1980s,although the
recovery was more fragile and less certain
for some countries in the region (such as
Brazil,where rates of spending contracted
at the close of the 1990s,then partially
recovered in 2000/01).
Overall investments in agricultural R&D
in Sub-Saharan Africa failed to grow by
more than 1 percent per year during the
1990s—the continuation of a longer run
slowdown.Even more disturbing,about half of the 27
African countries for which national estimates were
available spent less on agricultural R&D in 2000 than
they did in 1991 (Beintema and Stads 2004).
A notable feature of the growth trends is the
contraction in support for public agricultural R&D
among rich countries (Figure 1).During the 1980s,real
public agricultural R&D spending grew by an average of
2.3 percent per year for the rich countries compared
with an average rate of decline of 0.6 percent per year
during the 1990s.While spending in the United States
picked up in the second half of the 1990s (2.9 percent
per year for 1995–2000 versus 1.5 percent per year for























Figure 1  Public agricultural R&D spending trends
SOURCE:  Table 2.
NOTE: Inflation-adjusted growth rates were calculated as weighted regional 


























































1976–81 1981–91 1991–2000occurred in Japan (and,to a lesser degree,several
European countries) toward the end of the 1990s,leading
to a decline (albeit small) in rich-country spending as a
whole for the decade.Once again,these new data
reinforce the longer run trends observed earlier—namely,
a fairly widespread scaling back,or at best a slowing down
of support for publicly performed agricultural research
among rich countries.In part,this points to a shifting
emphasis from publicly to privately performed agricultural
R&D,and to a shift in government spending priorities.
Inevitably,this will affect productivity prospects in agri-
culture for the countries in question.In addition,as Pardey,
Alston,and Piggott (2006) suggest (and as is discussed in
more detail later in this report),a more subtle and arguably
more important consequence is that slowdowns or
cutbacks in rich-country spending will curtail the future
spillovers of ideas and new technologies from rich to poor
countries.These rich–poor country linkages will be even
more attenuated as the funding trends proceed in parallel
with other policy and market developments,like strength-
ening intellectual property rights and biosafety regulations
and a reorientation of rich-country R&D away from
productivity gains in food staples toward concerns over
the environmental effects of agriculture,as well as the food
quality,medical,energy,and industrial applications of agri-
cultural commodities.While this research is likely to
generate substantial economic value,the fact that
developed countries,as a group,still account for nearly 41
percent of public agricultural R&D worldwide (and almost
80 percent of all science spending) means the conse-
quences of such continued funding,policy,and market
trends could be particularly pronounced in terms of the
productivity-enhancing effects on food staples.
The broad trends documented here mask many of the
aspects of agricultural R&D funding that have important
practical consequences.For example,undue variability in
research funding continues to be problematic for many
developing-country research agencies.This is especially
troubling for agricultural R&D,given the long gestation
period for new crop varieties and livestock breeds and the
desirability of long-term employment assurances for scien-
tists and other staff (Pardey,Alston,and Piggott 2006).
Variability encourages an overemphasis on short-term
projects or those with short lags between investment and
outcomes,and adoption.It also discourages specialization
of scientists and other resources in areas of work where
sustained funding may be uncertain,even when these areas
have high payoff potentials.
Institutional Orientation 
In this report,public agricultural research includes
research performed by government,higher education,and
nonprofit agencies.9There are substantial differences
among countries and between regions in the structure of
the public research sector (Figure 2). Public research in
the United States is done mainly in state agricultural
experiment stations (SAES) located principally in colleges
of agriculture and in federally administered,but often
regionally located,labs of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA).The SAES share of total USDA-SAES
research has increased over the past several
decades,from 67.2 percent in 1980 to 73.6
percent in 2004.Notably,state government
financing of SAES-performed R&D has
slipped from 54 percent in 1980 to 40
percent in 2004.Federal funding of SAES-
performed research has picked up in more
recent years—including funds disbursed
through USDA,as well as those from a host
of other federal government agencies (like
the National Institutes of Health,
Department of Defense,and Environmental
Protection Agency)—signaling a substantial
diversification of what now constitutes
“agricultural” research.Funds from other
(often private or self-generated) sources
have also increased,including royalty
revenues and licensing income from
protected intellectual property.
A much larger share of public agricul-
tural R&D in Latin America is conducted by























Figure 2  Institutional orientation of public agricultural R&D, 1981–2000
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators (ASTI) initiative data.
NOTES: The number of countries included in each category is shown in parentheses. 
The reported shares for Japan and the United States may understate the role of 
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the total in 1996 (the latest year for which an 11-country
total is available).This is similar to the government agency
share in our 27-country Sub-Saharan African total.Like
Latin America,a small but growing proportion of public
research in Sub-Saharan Africa is conducted by nonprofit
institutions;in 2000,for example,they accounted for 3
percent of total agricultural research staff (Figure 2).
Nonprofit institutions are often managed by independent
boards not directly under government control.Many are
closely linked to producer organizations from which they
receive the lion’s share of their funding,typically by way of
taxes levied on production or exports.Examples include
agencies conducting research on tea (Kenya,Tanzania,
Malawi),coffee (Uganda,Kenya,Tanzania),cotton (Zambia),
and sugar (Mauritius,South Africa).Noteworthy is the
establishment of various other forms of nonprofit institu-
tions,not linked to producer organizations,in a number of
countries,such as Madagascar and Togo.
In 2000,of the full-time equivalent (fte) researchers
working in nonprofit institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Madagascar,Mauritius,and South Africa (the southern
African region) employed about three-quarters.Togo was
the only country in West Africa to employ researchers in
nonprofit agencies,according to the available data,but they
totaled only 9 fte researchers in 2001. Although the
number of fte researchers working for nonprofit agencies
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa has increased considerably,
the rate of growth was less than in the corresponding
government and higher education sectors,with the result
that the nonprofit researcher share was smaller in 2000
than three decades earlier.
The continuing scarcity and comparatively small size
of national agricultural science institutions throughout
Africa has spurred attempts to strengthen subregional
research coordination and implementation capacities in
western,eastern,and southern Africa. 10 These regional
efforts were conceived to stimulate knowledge and tech-
nology spillovers among countries within regions,improve
the capacity to search for and obtain access to new
knowledge and technologies from further afield,achieve
economies of scope and scale in the conduct of research,
coalesce a critical mass of local scientific expertise around
regional priorities (which are not necessarily the sum of
national priorities),and achieve these aims in the face of
persistent national funding vagaries and the ravages of
HIV/AIDS on scientific capacity within the region.
Typically,research activities have been organized as
(sub)regional research networks coordinated by a regional
scientific research organization (for example,the
Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East
and Central Africa [ASARECA]). A good number of these
networks were originally established and managed by
centers of the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG).For many of the
same reasons behind the subregional networks developed
around national research capacities,the CGIAR is also in
the process of reconstituting its own African efforts
through joint subregional programs between relevant CG
centers,scientific research organizations,and national
research agencies.Integrated CGIAR medium-term invest-
ment plans for eastern and central Africa,for example,are
now well advanced.
The extent to which these new institutional arrange-
ments have increased funding for Sub-Saharan African
research is unclear,if not questionable. 11 Even in the
absence of increased funding,the hope is that these
regionalized arrangements will improve the relevance and
harmonization of R&D efforts sufficient to realize more
cost-effective research (via enhancing spillovers,achieving
a critical mass,and reducing R&D lag times),thereby
increasing the regional and national benefits from
research.A pessimistic view is that these regional arrange-
ments serve merely to redirect money otherwise
committed to national and international research,while at
the same time increasing transaction costs and the
earmarking of research funds in ways that undermine
research efficiencies.Indeed,it is unclear if many of the
arrangements already in place (or those contemplated)
substantially alter the existing incentives to innovate (and
to mobilize funding for that innovation),such that the
same problems that gave rise to an underfunding of
national research will simply be compounded by strategic
behavior among agencies now also operating in regional
institutional frameworks.12
Research Intensities
Turning now from absolute to relative measures of R&D
investments,developed countries as a group spent $2.36
on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of agricultural
output in 2000,a sizable increase over the $1.41 they
spent per $100 of output two decades earlier but,notably,
slightly down from the 1991 estimate of $2.38 (Figure 3).
This longer run rise in research intensity starkly contrasts
with the group of developing countries,where since 1981
there has been no measurable growth in the intensity of
agricultural research (that is,agricultural R&D spending
expressed as a percentage of agricultural gross domestic
product [AgGDP]).In 2000,the developing world spent
just 53 cents on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of
agricultural output.
At first glance,the combined rise in rich-country
intensity ratios and the stagnating research intensities for
poor countries belies the evidence presented in Figure 1,
where the growth in overall investments in agriculturalR&D in poor countries (3.1 percent per year from 1981
to 2000) significantly outpaced the rise in spending by rich
countries (1.1 percent per year).Delving deeper,agricul-
tural output grew much faster in aggregate for developing
versus developed countries over the past several decades,
so that the faster growth in aggregate agricultural
research spending among poor countries has,nonethe-
less,barely kept pace with the corresponding growth in
output.In other words,the scientific or knowledge
intensity of agricultural production grew at a much faster
rate in rich relative to poor countries; indeed,the
intensity gap has grown over the past
several decades.13 In addition,more than
half of the developed countries for which
data were available had higher research
intensity ratios in 2000 than they did in
1981,and the majority of them spent in
excess of $2.30 on public agricultural R&D
for every $100 of AgGDP.However,only 10
of the 26 Sub-Saharan countries in our
sample had higher 2000 intensity ratios than
in 1981,although most countries in our
Asian and Latin American samples (9 of 11
Asian countries and 7 of 11 Latin American
countries) increased their intensity ratios
over the 1981–2000 period.14
Other research intensity ratios are
also revealing (Table 4).Rich countries
spent $692 per agricultural worker in 2000,
more than double the corresponding 1981
ratio.Poor countries spent just $10 per
agricultural worker in 2000,substantially
less than double the 1981 figure.These
rich/poor country differences are,perhaps,
not too surprising.A much smaller share of the rich-
country workforce is employed in agriculture,and the
absolute number of agricultural workers declined more
rapidly in rich countries than it did in the poor ones.
While only some segments of society are directly
involved in agriculture as producers,everyone consumes
agricultural outputs,and so a look at agricultural R&D
spending per capita is instructive.These new data signal a
break from earlier trends.For rich countries,spending per
capita rose substantially from 1981 to 1991 (a continua-























Figure 3  Intensity of public agricultural R&D
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators (ASTI) initiative data. Agricultural GDP data are from World Bank (2005b).
NOTES: The intensity ratios measure total public agricultural R&D spending as a 
percentage of agricultural output agricultural GDP. The developing-country category 
includes countries that also constitute regional totals.
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Table 4—Alternative public agricultural research intensities, 1981, 1991, and 2000
SOURCE:Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data.Population and economically active
agricultural population are from FAO (2005a and b).
Region/grouping 1981 1991 2000 1981 1991 2000
Asia–Pacific 1.31 1.73 2.35 3.84 5.23 7.57
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.43 4.94 4.96 45.10 50.54 60.11
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.14 2.69 2.28 9.79 9.04 8.22
Middle East and North Africa 3.24 3.63 3.66 19.15 27.30 30.24
Developing-country subtotal 2.09 2.34 2.72 6.91 8.14 10.19
High-income country subtotal 10.91 13.04 11.92 316.52 528.30 691.63
Total 3.75 4.12 4.13 14.83 16.92 18.08
Agricultural R&D spending (2000 international dollars)
Per capita of economically active 






















Beintema 2001),but declined thereafter so
that spending per capita in 2000 had slipped
well below 1991 levels.This rich-country
reversal was driven mainly by developments
in Japan;although,only half the developed
countries continued to increase their per
capita spending on agricultural R&D
throughout the 1990s.
Spending per capita levels are much
lower among poor countries compared
with the rich ones.Developing countries
(especially those in Africa) typically spent
less than $3 per capita in 2000,whereas 59
percent of the developed countries invested
more than $10 per capita.Nonetheless,and
in contrast to the group of rich countries,
per capita spending for the group of poor
countries continued to rise,albeit slowly,
from $2.12 in 1981 to $2.72 in 2000.The
outlier to this general trend is Sub-Saharan
Africa,where agricultural R&D spending per
capita has continued to decline since at
least 1981.15
Spending per Scientist
Agricultural R&D spending grew compara-
tively quickly in many parts of the developing world
during the 1980s,but not fast enough to outpace the
corresponding growth in the number of scientists.After
adjusting for inflation and cross-country differences in
price levels,average spending per fte scientist for a
sample of 27 Sub-Saharan African countries fell quite
markedly from $190,000 (2000 international dollars) in
1981 to $132,000 two decades later (Figure 4).The fall
was less pronounced,but evident nonetheless,for the 11
Latin American and Caribbean countries for which time-
series data were available.Throughout the 1990s,real
spending per scientist stabilized somewhat,although it
drifted down slightly in Sub-Saharan Africa with signs of a
slight recovery in Latin America.These regional averages
inevitable obscure important country-specific details.For
example,the 1980s decline in support per scientist was
much more pronounced in Nigeria and Paraguay
compared with their respective regional averages.
Developing-country patterns (with a few exceptions)
markedly contrast developments in the United States.
U.S.public-sector spending per fte grew steadily from an
average of $222,017 (2000 prices) in 1981 to $356,911 in
2000—a 2.6 percent increase per year in the real
resources available per researcher.Of course,not all
states tracked the U.S.average trend.Spending per
scientist in some states (including Delaware,Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina) grew by less than 1 percent per year,
while 10 states grew faster than 4 percent annually.
Moreover,after adjusting for price-level differences
between countries,spending per scientist in some devel-
oping countries (such as South Africa) are comparable
with U.S.levels.
Public Versus Private 
Agricultural R&D 
For almost all of agriculture’s 10,000 year history,innova-
tion was mainly a private,individual undertaking.
Improved crop varieties,livestock breeds,and farm
management practices were typically the result of farmer
experimentation—adapting and developing earlier ideas,
then passing on inventions to siblings,children,and fellow
farmers.Collectively conceived and funded public
research did not begin until the early to mid-1700s as
part of the efforts of the agrarian societies that formed
throughout the United Kingdom and Europe at that time.
From these institutional roots,the publicly funded and
operated agricultural experiment stations developed
around the mid-1800s.But even as public agricultural
R&D took off,private agricultural R&D continued to
flourish.It too evolved,from the tinkering and trial-and-
error efforts of many individuals—most operating
alone—to large-scale input supply firms investing in their
Figure 4  Spending per researcher, 1981 to 2000
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators (ASTI) initiative data and, for the United States, USDA/CRIS (2006). 





































































































own private R&D facilities.For example,in U.S.agricul-
ture alone,Eli Whitney patented the cotton gin,Cyrus
McCormick’s mechanical reaper “made bread cheap,”
John Deere’s steel-tipped moldboard plows helped tame
the prairies,and Hiram Moore built the first combined
harvester (combining a reaper and a thresher in one
machine).The list of biological innovators is less well-
known,but the legendary Luther Burbank—who
developed scores of new and improved varieties,many of
which still bear his name—is representative of thousands
of farmer-scientists who,by careful selection and in some
cases hybridization,improved the plant varieties available
to American farmers.16
Particularly in agriculture,however,it is difficult for
individuals to fully appropriate the returns from their
research investments,and it is widely held that some
government action is warranted to ensure an adequate
investment in R&D to fully capture the public good
(Pardey, Alston and Piggott 2006).The private sector has
continued to emphasize inventions that are amenable to
various intellectual property protection options such as
patents,and more recently,plant breeders’ rights and
other forms of intellectual property.17 Private invest-
ments in agricultural R&D,like investments in all forms of
research,are motivated and sustained by the returns to
innovation reaped by that investment.Intellectual
property policies and practices are but one dimension of
the incentive to innovate.Potential market size and the
cost of servicing the market—in turn dependent on the
state of communication and transportation infrastruc-
ture,farm structure and size,and farm income—are
important dimensions as well.So too is the pattern of
food consumption.As incomes rise,larger shares of the
food expenditures go toward food processing,conven-
ience,and other attributes of food—areas where signifi-
cant shares of private agricultural research effort are
directed.
A large private presence is evident in agricultural
R&D,but with dramatic differences between rich and poor,
and among individual,countries (Table 5).In 2000,global
spending on agricultural R&D (including prefarm-,onfarm-,
and postfarm-oriented R&D) was $36.0 billion—about 36
percent of which was performed by private firms and the
remaining 64 percent by public agencies.Notably,about 93
percent of that private R&D was performed in rich
countries,where some 54 percent of the agricultural R&D
is private.In developing countries,only 6 percent of the
agricultural R&D is private and there are large disparities
in the private share among regions of the developing
world.In the Asia–Pacific region,nearly 8 percent of the
agricultural R&D is private compared with only 2 percent
of the research throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
The majority of private R&D in Sub-Saharan Africa
was oriented to crop-improvement research,often (but
not always) dealing with export crops,such as cotton (in
Zambia and Madagascar) and sugarcane (in Sudan and
Uganda).Virtually all the firms are small,both in terms of
total spending and numbers of researchers.They involve a
mix of locally owned companies (for example,Pannar
Seeds in Greytown,South Africa,or Kenana Sugar
Company in Sudan),as well as local affiliates of multina-
tional companies.Moreover,almost two-thirds of the
private research performed throughout the whole region
was done in South Africa.Given the tenuous market
realities facing much of African agriculture,it is unrealistic
to expect marked and rapid development of locally
conducted private R&D.That said,there is substantial
potential,perhaps,for tapping into private agricultural R&D
done elsewhere—maybe through creative public–private
joint ventures.
Table 5—Estimated global public and private agricultural R&D investments, circa 2000
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data and data presented in
OECD (2005).
Region/country Public Private Total Public Private
Asia–Pacific 7,523 663 8,186 91.9 8.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 2,454 124 2,578 95.2 4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,461 26 1,486 98.3 1.7
Middle East and North Africa 1,382 50 1,432 96.5 3.5
Developing-country subtotal 12,819 862 13,682 93.7 6.3
High-income country subtotal 10,191 12,086 22,277 45.7 54.3
Total 23,010 12,948 35,958 64.0 36.0
Expenditures 
























Rich-country agricultural R&D is
increasingly a private-sector pursuit.The
privately performed share of agricultural
R&D in OECD countries grew steadily
from 43.6 percent in 1981 to 54.3 percent
in 2000 (Table 6).This trend may well
continue if the science of agriculture
increasingly looks like the sciences more
generally.In the United States,for example,
the private sector conducted nearly 52
percent of agricultural R&D in 2000
compared with 72 percent of all R&D
expenditures that same year (NSF 2005).
The rich/poor country disparity in the
intensity of agricultural research (noted in
Figure 3) is magnified dramatically if private
research is also factored in (Figure 5).In
2000,developing countries as a group had an
agricultural R&D intensity ratio of 0.56
percent (that is,for every $100 of agricul-
tural GDP,56 cents was spent on agricultural
R&D) compared with a ratio of 5.16 percent
for developed countries.This results in a
rich- versus poor-country intensity ratio of
9.2:1 compared with a 4.5:1 ratio if just
public research spending were considered.
Table 6—Total public and private agricultural R&D expenditures, selected countries from the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1981–2000
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on data presented in OECD (2005).
NOTES:Average annual growth rates calculated using the least-squares regression method,as described by the World Bank (2006,305).In 1981,
private sector agricultural R&D spending was estimated to be $6,422 million (2000 international dollars),$9,930 million in 1991,and $12,086
million in 2000.
Country 1981 1991 2000 1981–91 1991–2000
Australia 5.9 22.0 24.8 15.3 4.0
Canada 17.3 21.5 34.0 2.5 5.5
France 44.1 52.0 74.7 8.2 2.7
Germany 56.2 43.6 53.6 2.4 0.7
Japan 36.6 48.4 58.6 7.5 1.8
The Netherlands  44.8 56.1 57.7 9.3 1.1
United Kingdom  55.9 66.8 71.5 6.0 1.7
United States  49.3 51.0 51.5 3.6 2.4
OECD total (22) 43.6 48.5 54.3 5.2 2.1
Private share of total
(percent)
Average annual growth rate
(percent per year)
Figure 5  Public, private, and total agricultural R&D intensities, circa 2000
SOURCE: Calculated by authors based on Agricultural Science and Technology 
Indicators (ASTI) initiative data and data presented in OECD (2005).
NOTE: The intensity ratios measure total public and private agricultural R&D 
spending as a percentage of agricultural output (agricultural GDP).
Total Private Public




























Figure B2  Potential drought risk for rainfed production across all cultivated land in agriculture
Figure 6  Distribution of the world’s cultivated systems by agroecological class
See the section Agroecologies and Research Spillovers (overleaf) for a discussion of Figures 6 and 7;see Box 2 (page 16)














































Most agricultural technologies are sensitive to local
climate,soil,and other biophysical attributes,making
them less easily transferable than other types of tech-
nologies,such as those arising from the medical or infor-
mation sciences.For example,soybeans are day-length
sensitive,so different varieties must be developed for
different latitudes.Likewise,many tropical soils are
naturally acidic,a less prevalent problem in temperate
areas;consequently,crops that thrive in temperate soils
can fail or falter under tropical conditions.Variability in
the agroecological basis of agriculture means that
imported technologies often have to be adapted to local
conditions before they can be used (as was usually the
case with Green Revolution wheat and rice varieties).
Nevertheless,for some developing countries and for
some types of technologies,the least-cost option has
been to import and adapt technology—and this will
continue to be so.
However,while the importance of technology
spillover is well recognized,it has often proved difficult to
incorporate technology transfer potentials into strategic
research-planning perspectives.In part,this simply stems
from the limited (informed) use of new sources of data
on the distribution of key biophysical attributes of the
world’s agricultural production environments.Figure 6
(see page 12) provides an agroecological typology of the
world’s cultivated systems,going beyond the purely
rainfall and temperature attributes that,for example,
underpinned the agroclimatic characterization by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO 1978–81) and the early agroecologically based
efforts of the CGIAR (CGIAR/TAC 1991).The typology
shown here extends these prior efforts by adding the
important distinction between irrigated and rainfed lands,
and sloping and flat lands.Furthermore,the map focuses
attention on the actual rather than potential area of culti-
vated production.Such attributes bring greater
geographic specificity to the search for homologous
production conditions as a basis for spillins (looking for
potential sources of improved knowledge and 
technology from locations with similar production envi-
ronments that could be applied locally) or spillouts
(taking innovative ideas and technologies known to be
successful locally and searching for locations with similar
production environments to which the innovations might
be transferable).
The regional distribution of agroecological attributes
of the world’s cultivated systems is presented in the top
half of Table 7.Despite the highly aggregated evidence
presented,these data suggest scope for potentially signifi-
cant technology spillover possibilities.19 For example,the
moderately cool tropics and subtropical areas that typify
some 14.5 percent of the cultivated area in Sub-Saharan
Africa also comprise significant shares of the cultivated
systems of Brazil,China,and even the United States.
Similarly,the warm tropics and subtropics—flat,rainfed
areas that form the greater share of the area in Sub-
Saharan Africa—also represent a significant share of the
cultivated agriculture in Brazil and India.Increasingly,
specific screening criteria—by adding soil characteristics,
climate variability,and the like—could be applied in order
to delineate increasingly focused geographic domains that
might offer opportunities for technology spillover.
There are several ways of exploring the use of
spatially explicit information to help guide the search for
inward or outward looking technology spillover
opportunities. Figure 7 (see page 13) illustrates the
spatial incidence of different biophysical suitabilities for
the rainfed production of spring wheat (Panel A) and rice
(Panel B).Again, being more specific about the attributes
of production subsystems and technologies (for example,
saline-tolerant lowland rice varieties) would allow the
geography of potential spillover opportunities to be
more sharply defined.20 An interesting feature of the
two panels, even with this highly aggregated
agroecological characterization, is the distinct spatial
pattern in the potential production geographies of the
two crops.Areas evidently suitable for spring wheat, a
Agroecologies and Research Spillovers 
T
he spending figures previously presented refer to national investments, but agricultural innovation
need not be homegrown.A striking feature of the history of agricultural development is that
agricultural science and technology spillovers have been pervasive both within and among countries.18 The
result is that agricultural technologies move across borders, both by design and by accident. Spillovers
extend beyond agricultural technologies that can be adapted to local conditions to include the underlying






















crop typically better adapted to temperate climates, do
not coincide spatially with those (largely tropical and
subtropical) areas suitable for growing rainfed rice.
The broad global extent of cultivated lands depicted
in Figure 6 (whose limits are inferred from satellite-
derived data on actual land cover,and whose agroecolog-
ical composition is summarized in the top half of Table 7),
represents the outcome of a complex interaction
between agroecological (biophysical) factors that
condition production potential (as indicated for wheat
and rice in Figure 7) and a host of socioeconomic,demo-
graphic,cultural,and policy factors that have shaped the
realization of that potential.The bottom half of Table 7
summarizes a novel dataset on the actual spatial
incidence of agricultural (that is,crop and livestock)
production at the turn of the millennium.Production is
summarized in terms of aggregate value,derived as the
product of location-specific estimates of production
quantities (annual average for 1999–2001) weighted by
average world commodity prices (annual average for
1989–91) denominated in international dollars for FAO’s
production database commodities (Cassman et al.2005).
Table 7— Agroecological and production attributes of the world’s cultivated systems by region
SOURCES:Constructed by authors using data and digitized maps underlying Wood,Sebastian and Scherr (2000) for area data and Cassman et al.
(2005) for value of production data.
NOTES:The data underlying this table involve a mix of timeframes and spatial scales.The most comprehensive global assessment of cropland
extent is from 1992/93,the most complete set of commodity prices in international units is from 1989/91,and the production quantity data are
from 1999/2001.The underlying spatial data resolutions range from 1 to 2,500 square kilometers (land cover to climate data,respectively).The
global extent of cultivated area is based on a 1 kilometer resolution satellite-derived dataset that contains over 900 million pixels,of which 215
million (23 percent) represent land area and just over 50 million constitute the approximately 37.3 million square kilometers with crop cultivation
(areas in which at least 30 percent or more of a pixel is determined to be cultivated).
a Includes Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries,except Mexico.
Rainfed Rainfed Rainfed
(humid and Rainfed (humid and Rainfed (humid and Rainfed
subhumid) (semiarid subhumid) (semiarid subhumid) (semiarid 
Region/country and irrigated and arid) and irrigated and arid) and irrigated and arid) Total
Share of agricultural area (percent) 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.0 0.0 26.7 4.2 54.1 14.9 100
Brazil 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 68.5 16.5 100
Asia–Pacific 15.0 7.6 21.3 5.2 41.4 9.6 100
China 34.8 19.1 37.8 0.5 7.8 0.0 100
India 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.0 58.8 36.2 100
Middle East and North Africa  6.9 14.4 49.5 29.3 0.0 0.0 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 15.9 3.4 37.9 42.8 100
Eastern Europe 33.4 65.4 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 100
Developed countriesa 54.1 13.9 21.8 7.5 1.3 1.4 100
Japan 84.4 2.2 13.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
United States 57.3 14.6 18.6 4.1 2.0 3.3 100
World 21.6 16.1 19.2 4.6 26.4 12.2 100
Share of agricultural production (percent)
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.0 0.6 6.0 7.2 73.4 12.8 100
Brazil 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 88.9 9.4 100
Asia–Pacific  26.0 8.4 5.3 1.4 51.4 7.5 100
China 43.0 15.7 8.6 2.2 30.5 0.0 100
India 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 73.0 25.7 100
Middle East and North Africa 3.2 12.8 5.5 16.9 36.1 25.4 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 16.6 7.5 34.6 41.3 100
Eastern Europe 49.6 48.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.4 100
Developed countriesa 61.7 9.6 2.1 2.7 18.5 5.4 100
Japan 78.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 100
United States 61.4 15.1 0.9 4.5 15.0 3.2 100
World 32.6 9.8 4.8 3.6 40.2 9.0 100
Temperate
Cool tropics and 
subtropics























Droughts manifest themselves in many ways.Of greatest consequence to farmers are agricultural droughts—that is,conditions
of water shortage in the root zone of crops during growing season.The crop productivity consequences of drought are most
affected by the timing (seasonal distribution) and quantity of rainfall,potential evapotranspiration rates,and the water-
holding capacity of soils.Important too are the water use characteristics of individual crops,such as the depth and effective-
ness of crop roots and the susceptibility of the crop to water stress at different phenological stages of growth.About 32 percent
of the 99 million hectares of wheat grown in developing countries in the early 1990s was exposed to various intensities of
drought stress (Rajaram,Braun,and van Ginkel 1996).Thus,crop breeders often test their breeding material for tolerance to
water stress at the early,mid,and late stages of the growing season.Different crops,and even different varieties within single
crop species,can have quite distinct susceptibilities to drought.All of this makes it difficult to find compact ways of character-
izing the production risks associated with different types of agricultural drought.Ideally,measures of drought risk should be
developed for specific locations that also reflect the use of specific germplasm in specific production systems.However,the
complexity of drought provides broad scope for developing mitigation strategies including selection or development of late
planting or early maturing varieties,altered plant architecture to enhance root performance or reduce stomatal release of
water,and improved agronomic practices that increase water availability in the rooting zone or minimize heat stress (for
example,see Serraj et al.2003 and Rajaram,Braun,and van Ginkel 1996).
A global perspective of the incidence of regional and global drought risk is summarized in Table B2 and mapped in Figure
B2a (for map see page 12).The measure of drought risk used is the annual variation (around a three-decade average) of the
length-of-growing-period (LGP) computed for each year from 1961 to 1990 (Fischer et al.2002),arbitrarily divided into three
drought-risk classes of roughly equal area globally.This measure is not ideal in terms of representing the multidimensional
nature of agricultural drought described above,but it does have certain desirable attributes.b Perhaps most importantly,it is
derived by taking a long time-series of actual rainfall and evapotranspiration data as input to a soil moisture model that
accounts for both the depth and water holding properties of local soils.These calculations were performed worldwide across a
20 by 20 kilometer grid for the climate data and a 5 by 5 kilometer grid for the soils.In each year,the growing season is defined
to start when rainfall exceeds half potential evapotranspiration and to conclude when the soil moisture reserve is depleted.
From a crop growth perspective,this approach provides a much more relevant measure of drought than could be obtained,for
example,by using rainfall records alone.While the measure does not give a clear indication of the type of agricultural drought
that might have occurred (for example,early,mid-,or late growing season),variation in the length of growing season incorpo-
rates the effects of each,or any combination,of these individual drought types.
One striking feature of Figure B2 is the geographically widespread extent of potentially drought-prone areas.In some
places rainfed production risks can be mitigated by irrigation (separate breakdowns show that drought risks are higher in
predominantly irrigated compared with predominantly rainfed areas,and in sloping compared with flat lands).In general,high
drought risk is two to four times more common in drier cropland areas,and in the most drought-prone group of agroecosys-
tems—namely,cool/cold,semi-arid,tropics,and subtropics—around three-quarters of the cropland extent is deemed to have
highly variable rainfall (although,collectively these agroecosystems represent only 5 percent of global cropland).The second
most drought-prone agroecosystem is the drier temperate croplands (comprising some 16 percent of the global cropland total)
where almost 70 percent of the area is subject to a high risk of drought.About two-thirds of the cropland of Eastern Europe
falls into this category.The least drought-impacted agroecosystem,the warm humid tropics and subtropics,constituting over
one-quarter of cropland globally,suffers from highly variable rainfall on only 10 percent of its extent.From a regional perspec-
tive,the Middle East/North Africa and Eastern Europe regions appear the most affected,with over half their cropland exposed
to high drought risk.
Table B2 reveals some surprising results.Over 90 percent of the dry (arid,semi-arid) temperate cropland in the United
States (which is almost 15 percent of U.S.cropland) is categorized as high water-stress risk.Overall,more than 40 percent of
U.S.cultivated lands appears to be exposed to inherently high rainfall variability.While reference to the long-term mean LGP
must be an integral part of an interregional comparison of water stress conditions,clearly investments in irrigation and well-
targeted agronomic practices play a large role in mitigating the potentially negative impacts of this variability.c In Sub-
Saharan Africa,a region plagued by drought and famine,the results suggest that of the two largest agroecosystems—the humid
(38 percent) and the dry (43 percent) warm tropics and subtropics,together representing over 80 percent of the region’s total
cropland—only 4 percent and 30 percent,respectively,exhibit high water-stress variability.Again,lower average LGP conditions
are clearly associated with greater variability in water availability.One potential source of these intuitively low estimates of
























small and often diffuse agricultural land holdings in both wetter and drier areas are poorly discriminated by the type of
medium-resolution sensors used to derive the global land cover data used in this analysis.However,as shown in Figure B2,
a broader perspective of agricultural land,including pasture and grazing areas (which undoubtedly contain many cropped
holdings undetected by the satellite sensors) together with areas designated as cropland,reveals that a large share of the 
agricultural area of the Sahel and eastern and southern Africa is clearly predisposed to high drought risk.
SOURCES: Fischer et al.2002;Hayes et al.2004;Rajaram,Braun,and van Ginkel 1996;Serraj et al.2003.
aThe map indicates growing period variability over all agricultural land (cropland,rangeland,and pasture),whereas the table summarizes this variability within
cropland only (as depicted in Figure 6).
bThe key shortcoming is that the variability (coefficient of variation,or CV) in LGP encompasses both longer (wetter) as well as shorter (drier) growing seasons
in the historic record.Furthermore,variability presents less of a production risk where LGP is high.Thus a +/– 20 percent variability in LGP likely presents less
production risk (certainly less risk of total harvest failure) where annual average LGP is 270 days than where it is 90 days.Empirically,however,visual inspec-
tion of Figure B2 suggests that the CV of LGP does provide an intuitively reasonable picture of areas that are more or less drought prone.
cThough precise economic impacts are difficult to assess,the U.S.National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska has compiled a range
of estimates,including some US$11 billion dollars in losses to agriculture as a consequence of the 2002 drought.The center also reports indemnities paid for
crop losses (predominantly for drought) in Nebraska alone were $190 million for the drought of 2000,and more than $372 million for the drought of 2002
(Hayes et al.2004).
Table B2—Incidence of high drought-risk potential for rainfed production by agroecosystem and region
SOURCE:Calculated by authors.
NOTES:Table includes only cultivated agroecosystem areas,not rangelands. See Table 7 for area shares of each region by agroecosystem (physical
area share of the region exposed to high risk is the product of the area shares in Table 7 and the high risk share in this table).Cells are blank if area
shares reported in Table 7 are less than 1 percent of the regional/country total. A zero entry indicates an area share greater than 1 percent,but
there are no high drought risks.




Region/country cultivation Humid Dry Humid Dry Humid Dry All
Developing countries
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 0 28 96 11 93 31
Brazil 9 0 0 3 0 8 97 22
Asia–Pacific 26 31 68 20 75 11 25 25
China 9 37 71 0 5 0 0 27
India 7 0 0 45 22 25 24
Middle East and North Africa  4 33 38 62 47 0 0 52
Sub-Saharan Africa 15 0 0 36 4 30 20
Eastern Europe 16 35 66 0 0 56
Developed countriesa 24 19 79 31 85 55 100 36
Japan <1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United States 10 25 94 40 98 57 100 44
World 100 26 68 32 74 10 46 34
Share of global cultivated land 22 16 19 5 26 12 100
Temperate Cool (sub)tropics
Share of agroecosystem exposed to 























Significant differences are found in the spatial
patterns of agricultural areas and the value of agricultural
production.Whereas more than 35 percent of the
world’s agricultural area is found in the semi-arid/arid
temperate zones and the humid/subhumid cool
tropics/subtropics (columns 2 and 3 of Table 7,respec-
tively) these zones contribute only 15 percent of the
world’s agricultural production value.It is estimated that
over 40 percent of the value of agricultural output comes
from the humid/subhumid warm tropics/subtropics
(column 5 in Table 7,a zone that accounts for only 26
percent of the world’s agricultural area),with a further
33 percent of agricultural value generated in the
humid/subhumid temperate zone (column 1 in Table 7).
Notably,both these tropical and temperate zones include
substantial irrigated areas.This discordance between the
physical area allocated to agriculture and the value of
production each area generates persists across most
regions of the world. An important implication of these
new data is that it could be misleading to use area alloca-
tion as the sole production-related criterion for targeting
agricultural research,thereby ignoring the agroecological
and economic realities that clearly have a dominant effect
on the spatial distribution of production value.
Importantly,both the supply and demand for
spillover technologies appears to be changing.Notably,
rich countries are reorienting their agricultural R&D
away from the types of technologies that are most easily
adapted and adopted by developing countries (Pardey,
Alston,and Piggott 2006).In addition,intellectual
property rights and other regulatory policies—including
biosafety protocols,trading regimes,and specific regula-
tory restrictions on the movement of genetic material—
are increasingly influencing the extent to which such
spillovers are feasible or economic.
Some developing countries have expanded their own
research capacity and shifted upstream,reducing their
emphasis on adaptive R&D (examples include the largest
developing countries:Brazil,China,and India).These
countries have become a potential source of new tech-
nologies for the poorest and smallest countries,which
will (or often should,given economic realities in the
























hile the CG system has captured the attention of the international agricultural R&D and aid
communities through the impact of its scientific achievements and its pivotal role in the Green
Revolution,it has spent only a small fraction of the global agricultural R&D investment.In 2000,the CG repre-
sented 1.5 percent of the $23 billion (2000 prices) global public-sector investment in agricultural R&D and just
0.9 percent of all public and private agricultural R&D spending.
CGIAR Trends
The nominal and real (that is,adjusted for inflation)
values of total expenditures for the CGIAR are shown in
Figure 8.The CG system began modestly.Between 1960
and 1964,of the institutes that would become the CG,
only IRRI was operating as such.After an initial expendi-
ture of US$7.4 million in 1960,total spending rose to
$1.3 million per year in 1965.By 1970,the four founding
centers—IRRI,CIMMYT,IITA,and CIAT—were allocated
a total of $14.8 million annually.21The progressive
expansion of the total number of centers and the
funding per center during the next decade involved a 10-
fold increase in nominal spending,to $141 million in
1980.During the 1980s,spending continued to grow,
more than doubling in nominal terms to reach $305
million in 1990.The rate of growth had slowed but was
still impressive.In the 1990s,however,although the
number of centers grew—from 13 to 18 at one point,
but now 15—funding did not grow enough
to maintain the level of spending per center,
let alone the growth rates.Since 2000,
funding has grown in total but with a
continuing trend toward earmarked support
for specific projects and programs of
research involving multiple centers and
other research providers outside the CG.
In the early years of plenty,all the
centers grew together,but even during the
bountiful 1970s and 1980s,when all of the
centers grew,they did not all grow at the
same rate.A notable trend has been the
declining share of the four founding centers.
In 1971,these four centers accounted for
100 percent of the allocation.By 1980,their
share had slipped to 54 percent,and by
2004 it was down to 36 percent.During the
stagnation of the 1990s,nine centers expe-
rienced a nominal decline in support,
including the four founders—IRRI,CIAT,
CIMMYT,and IITA—along with CIP,ICRISAT,ILRI
(formerly ILCA and ILRAD),ICARDA,and ISNAR.22 The
centers being downgraded also tended to be the larger
centers.Among the pre-1990 centers,the International
Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) grew the
fastest,with its funding more than doubling in just five
years.Of the new entrants,the two forestry institutes
showed the greatest gains.These broad trends indicate
that,through both the addition of new centers and the
allocation of funds among centers,the agenda of the CG
shifted dramatically away from its original focus,espe-
cially in the 1990s.
In its early years,virtually all CG funding came in the
form of unrestricted support (wherein the funds were
earmarked by center and spending within a center was
largely at the discretion of center management).This
remained the dominant mode of funding for the CGIAR
Figure 8  Nominal and real expenditures of CGIAR–supported centers 
SOURCE:  Alston, Dehmer, and Pardey (2006).
NOTES: Expenditures are in 2000 prices. Pre-1972 expenditures represent funds to 
precursor international research institutes. Data for the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) date from 1960; data for the International Center for Maize and 
Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT) and Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical 
(CIAT) date from 1966; and data for International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 








































































































throughout the 1970s,a period when total funding grew
the fastest and the number of centers grew from 4 in
1971 to 13 in 1980 (Figure 8).Typically,new entrants
were fully funded with unrestricted support,while unre-
stricted funding for existing centers remained a very
significant share of their respective totals throughout the
1970s and early 1980s.For example,in 1982,unrestricted
funds as a share of the CG total averaged 84 percent—
about 82 percent for the four founding centers and 87
percent for the incoming centers.
The period after 1983 was one of a continuing
decline in the share of unrestricted funds—down to 44.5
percent of the total in 2003 compared with a 1980s
average of 81.2 percent (and a 1970s average of 88.2
percent for the precursor centers of the CG).This
decline since the early 1980s has two distinct phases.For
the period through to 1987,the unrestricted share fell,
while total funding for the CG (in real terms) continued
to rise.For the period thereafter,both real funding and
the unrestricted share declined,partly reflecting the fact
that most of the newly admitted centers in the 1990s
joined with comparatively small shares of unrestricted
support (unlike the wave of new entrants that joined
during the 1970s).The corollary to the decline in the
share of unrestricted funding is a rise in the share of























evelopment aid as a source of funding agricultural R&D has been an important source of sponsorship
for CGIAR research and has also played a pivotal part in underwriting national R&D efforts in some
countries and some regions of the world,especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.Piecing together a coherent picture
of general trends in the aid–agricultural R&D relationship is hampered by access to data;hence relevant,yet
incomplete,evidence is presented below.
Development Aid and Agricultural R&D
Since 1960,official development assistance (ODA)
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
countries,including both multilateral and bilateral assis-
tance,grew in real terms to a peak of US$72.6 billion
(2000 prices) in 1992,dropping to $51.2 billion by 2001
(and increasing thereafter to $74.5 billion in 2004).There
was no clear shift in the bilateral ODA share over time—
during the 1990s,bilateral (country-to-country) aid
averaged around 70 percent of total aid (Table 8).Data on
the sectoral orientation of aid are available for bilateral
but not multilateral funds.In contemporary times,the
agricultural component of bilateral assistance grew
steadily,to peak at $6.5 billion in 1988 and decline there-
after to just $2.0 billion in 2003.The data suggest a strong
shift away from agriculture in aid funding priorities.As a
share of all bilateral aid,agriculture fell from 15.2 percent
in 1988 to only 4.2 percent in 2003.
Aid for Agricultural R&D
After several decades of strong support,international
funding for agriculture and agricultural research began to
decline around the mid-1980s,as support for economic
infrastructure as well as health,education,and other social
services began to grow.Data on aggregate trends are
simply not available,but information on agricultural R&D
grants and loans from the World Bank and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) is
obtainable.
The amount of funding that USAID directed toward
agricultural research conducted by national agencies in
less-developed countries declined by 75 percent in
inflation-adjusted terms from the mid-1980s to 2004
(Figure 9,Panel A). Asian countries experienced the
largest losses,from around $45 million (in 2000 prices) in
the mid-1980s to zero in 2004.Support to Africa and
Table 8—Aid to agriculture, 1970–2004 
SOURCES:Adapted from Alston,Dehmer,and Pardey (2006).
NOTE:n.a.indicates not available.
a Preliminary estimate.
1970 24,719 20,886 4.91
1975 35,448 26,233 11.13
1980 49,166 31,875 16.63
1985 41,773 30,782 15.93
1990 67,071 47,540 11.39
1995 64,077 44,129 9.82
2000 53,749 36,064 6.36
2003 65,502 47,222 4.22
2004 74,483a 50,700a n.a.
Bilateral aid
Total official development assistance (ODA) Amount Share to agriculture






















Latin America and the Caribbean was also cut severely:by
2004 funding had fallen to only 23 percent of mid-1980s
levels for Africa and 2 percent for Latin America and the
Caribbean.Since 1997,USAID funding for all of agriculture
(including agricultural R&D) has also failed to regain the
ground it lost.Thus funding for agricultural R&D has
suffered,with the majority going to support global (mainly
CGIAR) research rather than research conducted in
national labs in the developing world.In fact,in 2004,the
data underpinning Figure 9a indicate that USAID
committed just $15 million to nationally performed agri-
cultural R&D for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Over the past two decades,World Bank lending to
the rural sector has been erratic,but after adjusting for
inflation,the general trend has been downward.
Agriculture’s share of total lending has also declined (from
an average of 26 percent during the first half of the 1980s
to only 10 percent by 2000).There is no discernable
pattern in the amount of World Bank lending authorized
for agricultural R&D,other than a temporary increase in
loan approvals in the late 1980s and early 1990s,and an
exceptionally large amount of lending in 1998 resulting
mostly from loans with large research components
approved for India ($136 million,current prices),China
($68 million),and Ethiopia ($60 million) (Figure 9,Panel
B).The size of the loans has been highly variable,ranging
from $0.1 million for Argentina in 1992 and Niger in 1997,
to $136 million for India in 1998.
Sub-Saharan Africa
The era of substantial donor support for
agricultural R&D in Sub-Saharan Africa
appears to be drawing to a close—with
certainty if recent trends continue.Donor
contributions (including World Bank loans)
accounted for an average of 35 percent of
funding to principal agricultural research
agencies in 2000.Pardey and Beintema
(2001) estimated that five years earlier,
close to half the agricultural research
funding in the region was derived from
donor contributions (Figure 10).
These regional averages mask great
variation among countries.In 2000,donor
funding accounted for more than half of the
agricultural R&D funding in 7 of the 23
sample countries.Eritrea,in particular,was
highly dependent on donor contributions.
Its principal agricultural research agency
received more than three-quarters of its
funding from donors.In contrast,donor
funding was quite insignificant in Botswana,
Malawi,Mauritius,and Sudan (less than 5
percent).From the mid-1990s to 2000,one-
third of the sample countries experienced
declines of 10 percent or more in the
donors’ share of total agricultural R&D
funding,while the share of funding from
donor sources increased by at least 10
percent for four countries (namely,Burundi,
Gambia,Tanzania,and Togo).Notably,donor
funding fell from over 50 percent of the
total to 10 percent or less for Malawi,
Niger,and Sudan,as a result of the comple-
tion of major projects funded by World
Bank loans or contributions from the FAO.
Figure 9  Donor support for agricultural R&D by region, in U.S. dollars
































































Panel A.  United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 



























































































Funding from nongovernment or donor sources,
such as internally generated revenues, was comparatively
small, representing just 11 percent of total funding in
2000.The exceptions are Benin and Côte d’Ivoire.The
principal agricultural research agencies in these two
countries generated significant shares of total funding
from research contracts, commercialization of agricultural
products, and dissemination of research results. In some
cases, this practice was dictated by the terms of the
international loans for agricultural R&D. For example, in
Côte d’Ivoire, the World Bank’s second National
Agricultural Services Support Project (PNASA II) had an
important commercialization component, stipulating that
35 percent of the annual budget of the National
Agricultural Research Center (CNRA) was to be self-
generated through mechanisms such as commodity sales
(Beintema and Stads 2004).
Implications
There are substantial and potentially profound changes
under way regarding agricultural R&D worldwide.Global
investments in agricultural research have continued to
grow,albeit at a much slower rate in the 1990s than in
previous decades.These new data suggest a global bifurca-
tion in the conduct of agricultural R&D,with
a select few developing countries showing
signs of closing in on the higher amounts
and higher intensity of investment in agricul-
tural R&D typically found in the rich
countries.Meanwhile,a large number of
developing countries are either stalling or
slipping in terms of the amount spent on
agricultural R&D,the intensity of investment,
or both.The private sector maintains a big
presence in the rich countries and a growing
presence in a small number of developing
countries where agricultural input markets
are growing and becoming more cost-
effective to service.
In 2000,80 developing countries in the
world got by with a combined total of just
$1.4 billion of public agricultural R&D
spending (about 6.3 percent of the global
total). By way of comparison,more than 35
public universities in the United States each
spent in excess of this amount in 2004.
Increasing the amount spent on agricultural
R&D in low-income countries that are
heavily reliant on agriculture is likely to be a
wise,but difficult,investment given the
pressing demands on the cash-strapped
governments in these economies (Runge et
al.2003).However,simply maintaining current agricultural
R&D policies could leave many developing countries as
agricultural technology orphans in the decades ahead.
Developing countries may have to become more self-
reliant and perhaps more dependent on one another for
the collective goods of agricultural R&D and technology
(Pardey,Alston,and Piggott 2006).Some of the more
advanced developing countries like Brazil,China,India,and
South Korea seem to be gaining ground,with productive
and self-sustaining local research sectors taking hold.
However,other parts of the developing world,like
Bangladesh,Indonesia,and Zambia,are merely regaining
lost ground or slipping further behind.Aside from a
handful of larger countries,significant numbers of devel-
oping countries,especially in Africa,continue to face
serious funding and institutional constraints that inhibit
the effectiveness of local R&D.Together these factors may
spell serious food deficits for some of these countries.
Achieving the rate of agricultural productivity gains
necessary to feed the generally faster-than-average
growing populations in the poorer parts of the world
requires giving much more explicit attention to tapping
and adapting technologies developed elsewhere and
better targeting of those technologies to maximize local
Figure 10  Sources of funding by country in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
    1995/96 and 2000
SOURCE:  Beintema and Stads (2004).
NOTES: Funding data include only the main agricultural research agencies in each 
of the respective countries. Combined, these agencies accounted for 76 percent of 
total spending for the 23-country sample in 2000. Data for West Africa, with the 
exception of Nigeria, are for 2001.
Own income Donors Government Other
















































food-security and agricultural development impact.
However,the shifting scientific orientation of rich-country
research,combined with changing biosafety and intellec-
tual property regimes internationally,suggests that the
technology spillover pathways of the past may not carry
forward,even to the near future.New institutional
arrangements (including improving the allocation and effi-
ciency with which scarce agricultural R&D funds are
deployed) will likely be required—and are possible,if the
pipeline of agricultural technologies useful for poor-























1. See Alston et al.(2000) for a comprehensive review.
2 . This section draws from Pardey,Dehmer,and El Feki (2006).In measuring and classifying (agricultural) research
expenditures,the guidelines laid down in OECD (2002) have been followed.Research spending data are reported by
performer,irrespective of the funding source.
3 . All currency values are expressed in international dollars unless explicitly stated otherwise.Data in this section refer
to gross expenditures on research and development (GERD).See Box 1 for more details on the methods used to
deflate R&D spending denominated in current local currency units to 2000 prices and then convert the results to a
common numeraire currency unit.
4 . Here,and throughout this report,growth rates are calculated by the least squares regression method detailed by the
World Bank (2006,324).IAC (2004) provides a comprehensive assessment of the need for strengthening science
capacity throughout the developing world.
5. Notably,during the second half of the 1990s,GERD grew by just 2.2 percent per year in Japan—roughly one-third
the corresponding U.S.annual rate of 6.0 percent.
6. Hereafter,the terms developed,rich,and high-income are used interchangeably,referring to the high-income
countries of the OECD.Further,the terms developing,poor,and low-income are also used interchangeably,referring
to all countries other than the high-income members of the OECD.
7. In 2000,South Africa accounted for nearly 25 percent of all agricultural R&D spending in Sub-Saharan Africa,although
Liebenberg and Kirsten (2006) note the severe contraction in research capacity of the Agricultural Research Council
(ARC),the largest provider of agricultural research in South Africa (accounting for nearly 58 percent of the country’s
agricultural R&D spending in 1999).They note that “the number of research staff at ARC dropped from 751 in 1992
to 682 in 2000 (and 525 in April 2003)” Liebenberg and Kirsten (2006,212).
8 . For more details,see Pal and Byerlee (2006),on India,and Fan,Qian,and Zhang (2006),on China.
9. For some purposes it may be useful to classify nonprofit agencies as private entities,distinguishing between private-
for-profit and private,nonprofit research.
10. More strictly speaking,this has been the case in western and central Africa,eastern and central Africa,and eastern
and southern Africa,with country overlap among these regional groupings.For example,the Democratic Republic of
Congo (central Africa) is a member of both the western and eastern subregions,and Tanzania is a member of both
eastern and southern consortia.
11. It is likely that the national and international R&D trends presented above (based on a research performers) and
below (based on development assistance for research) capture the vast majority of subregional expenditures on
agricultural R&D,irrespective of the mode of allocating and conducting the research.The overall trend,at least
through to 2000,indicates a continuing slowdown in total support for African agricultural R&D.
12. Cross-country collective action to conceive and conduct research,absent counterpart institutional innovation to
generate and allocate funding for regional research,may be of little positive consequence.The Regional Fund for
Agricultural Technology (FONTAGRO)—established in 1998 as a competitive,regional mechanism to support
research and innovation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean—is a creative example of one such funding
mechanism.FONTAGRO has channeled a total of US$9.5 million (not counting $2 million available for the current,
2006,call for proposals) as direct support to projects,with regional organizations and others providing
approximately $21 million in counterpart funding.This is well below the funding expectations for this initiative,
underscoring the reluctance of national governments (and others) to cede funds for regional research,even if they
are the potential beneficiaries of that research.Binenbaum and Pardey (2005),for example,describe a range of






















13. This may indicate that increasingly knowledge-intensive agricultural production systems must invest increasingly
greater shares of their research in simply maintaining (distinct from increasing upon) past yield gains.See Alston,
Norton,and Pardey (1998,31–32) and the citations therein for more discussion of this point.
14. There are only 26 countries in the Sub-Saharan African sample for this calculation because Eritrea did not exist as
such until 1992.
15. In 2000,average spending per capita in Latin America and the Caribbean was also lower than in 1981 but higher than
the corresponding 1991 ratio.
16. Alston and Pardey (2006) provide historical data and a more complete description of long-run technological and
productivity developments in U.S.agriculture.
17. Wright et al.(2006) provide a more comprehensive treatment of the forms of intellectual property protection used
in agriculture worldwide.
18. Assessing the formal impact evaluation literature,Alston (2002) contends that up to half the local productivity gains
in agriculture over the past several decades are attributable to the effects of spillin technologies developed
elsewhere.For example,Pardey et al.(1996) showed that research conducted on wheat and rice by the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI),respectively,
almost entirely in developing countries,provided very large economic benefits to the U.S.wheat and rice sectors.
This was as a consequence of technology spillover,where wheat and rice varieties generated for developing-country
farmers could either be adopted directly by U.S.farmers or,more often,be incorporated into U.S.–focused crop
improvement programs.See also Evenson and Gollin (2003).
19. The table presents agroecological attributes aggregated to 6 classes.These are derived from the 14 classes shown in
Figure 6,which in turn is a summary of more disaggregated attributes.Using geographical information system (GIS)
tools,the degree of aggregation of the agroecological data can be varied so as to best match the nature of the
technology investment and development decisions being assessed.
20. See Box 2 for a more in-depth assessment of the spatially variable extent and nature of drought in an agricultural
context.
21. IRRI is the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines,CIMMYT the Spanish acronym for the
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico,IITA the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
in Nigeria,and CIAT the Spanish acronym for the International Center for Tropical Agriculture in Colombia.
22. CIP is the International Potato Center,ICRISAT is the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics,ILRI is the International Livestock Research Institute,ICARDA is International Center for Agricultural
Research in the Dry Areas in,and ISNAR is the International Service for National Agricultural Research,now a
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